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	<title>Comments on: Smack that &#8216;fish</title>
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	<pubDate>Tue, 06 Jan 2009 03:00:54 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: saket</title>
		<link>http://www.socialstartups.com/2006/11/07/smack-that-fish/comment-page-1/#comment-2</link>
		<dc:creator>saket</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Nov 2006 23:55:05 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>hmm... it seems like the solution changes depending on whether you take the payout to be "out of stock" or "buy for $1". if you take it as "out of stock" (say, with a payout of $0) then the nash equilibria is (wait,wait), which is the optimal, cooperative solution, too. 

however, if you take it as "buy for $1" then there is no nash equilibria (both strategies are equal -- no matter what strategy you take, you either get it for $1 or $10). which is neat, cause if both would just cooperate, then BOTH get it for $1, always.

-saket</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>hmm&#8230; it seems like the solution changes depending on whether you take the payout to be &#8220;out of stock&#8221; or &#8220;buy for $1&#8243;. if you take it as &#8220;out of stock&#8221; (say, with a payout of $0) then the nash equilibria is (wait,wait), which is the optimal, cooperative solution, too. </p>
<p>however, if you take it as &#8220;buy for $1&#8243; then there is no nash equilibria (both strategies are equal &#8212; no matter what strategy you take, you either get it for $1 or $10). which is neat, cause if both would just cooperate, then BOTH get it for $1, always.</p>
<p>-saket</p>
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